



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Europe's Economic Problems

by George A. Sloan

Western Europe today represents an encouraging picture for the future. Defense burdens notwithstanding, substantial progress has been made by most European countries in the stabilization and improvement of economic life. Inflation is under better control, with possible exception in Greece and Austria. Non-Soviet Europe has benefited economically, politically, socially and militarily from the impact of its participation in mutual security. With the continued development of military strength the likelihood of attack on the part of would-be aggressors is greatly lessened. As a result of the groundwork laid by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Western Europe should play a major role in securing a peaceful future for the free nations.

The economic programs currently undertaken by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Britain and Premier Antoine Pinay in France are constructive moves in the right direction. Indeed, the Pinay economic reforms are the most significant and promising steps in postwar France.

The new economic policy of the United States in Europe is impressive. Until recently there had been too much emphasis by Ameri-

can officials abroad on the practice of *inviting* countries to take the American taxpayers' money. Today most of the Western European countries prefer to rely less and less on American aid and grants. The Europeans would rather earn their way by selling more products for dollars in the American market.

The question is often asked here at home why Europe has not been able to finance itself in economic recovery and in rearmament. We must not forget that two world wars have greatly impoverished their peoples. Subsequently the Korean war, the war in Indo-China, the internal trouble in Malaya and the disturbed conditions in raw material markets have aggravated the international economic picture. But there are man-made obstacles which should be removed within these countries themselves.

In the United Kingdom the coal crisis continues to be serious. Britain, once a coal exporting country, is still importing some coal. A bold experiment to revitalize the British coal industry with immigrant Italian miners has resulted in failure because of a reluctance by British miners to accept their Italian colleagues on an equal basis. The

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Italian miners are currently returning to their homeland. This problem can only be solved in Britain. In Western Germany, economic life is handicapped by the insistence of labor unions for representation on additional corporate boards of directors. This again is a local problem which can only be solved on the ground. In France, even under the Pinay government, the practice of the welfare state is still carried to extremes, as, for example, by government payments of regular monthly bonuses for children to even the well-to-do families of France. These are major stumbling-blocks to an economically healthy Europe which cannot be removed by American dollars.

To get even more for American dollars which we must spend in strengthening European defense, we should place with European industry defense orders for their use in re-armament. This program technically is known as "off-shore procurement." The placing by the United States of defense orders in Europe would achieve substantial savings in production and shipping. We could then effect reductions in over-all military aid expenditures and still obtain the same amount of weapons and manpower.

By placing fewer defense orders here and more abroad, a lessening of world-wide inflationary pressure can be realized. The dollar gap can be reduced by placing dollars into the hands of the Europeans for ultimate payment of goods obtained in the United States. Off-shore purchasing

has an equally strong morale effect on Europe by utilizing unemployed manpower. Currently, red tape is delaying the placement of more defense production contracts in European factories.

International Chamber Proposals

The May session of the International Chamber of Commerce brought about 200 business leaders from 25 countries to Paris. We addressed ourselves at this session to three major areas: the economic difficulties, with emphasis on inflationary and deflationary danger; the development of underdeveloped regions; and the current increase in trade barriers.

To control the economic crises we recommended that the first step was the balancing of government budgets at a level consistent with economic resources. We felt this could be done primarily by the elimination of subsidies and of the administrative apparatus now operating direct government controls.

We pointed out that a better application of manpower would result from increases in productivity. Management was asked to pledge itself to an increase in output and to greater efficiency in already available manpower and resources through improved methods of manufacture and distribution.

The systems of taxation in Europe, we believed, are in urgent need of overhauling. Excessively high rates are reducing incentives and curtailing production. Tax collection must

be improved in these countries to assure fair payment of taxes.

The business leaders from all over the free world without exception were convinced that a free exchangeability of currencies is not a distant goal but an early practical objective.

Stabilization loans under the Mutual Security Program were proposed as a major factor to convertibility. Secondly, creditor nations such as the United States were asked to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers to allow imported goods to compete in their home markets. Thirdly, the public must realize that government-to-government transactions can never replace the vital role of private capital in a healthy economy.

The ICC expressed its strong belief in Paris that governments of capital-exporting countries, such as the United States, must make clear that the essential source of financing international economic development is private capital. Technical assistance programs, including those undertaken by the United Nations, in the fields of health, education, transportation and agriculture must be regarded as additions and not as substitutes to private investments.

The businessmen from other lands warned the delegates from the United States that unless American trade barriers are lowered, the European countries will be forced to trade with the Soviets and their satellites. If the Western world is to flourish economically, it must achieve a prosperous growth of international trade conditions of freedom. To this end

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Cost Factor in Foreign Policy

How much is the United States willing to spend for its security? That is the foremost question of foreign policy raised by the Republican National Convention and its choice of General Dwight D. Eisenhower for the presidency. The platform on which General Eisenhower is running for the high office calls simultaneously for an expansion of America's foreign policy commitments and a retraction of the budget, most of which goes for foreign policy and the military establishment.

Republican Foreign Policy

The fact that General Eisenhower is the Republican nominee is in itself a repudiation of the foreign policy views of other leading Republicans, such as General Douglas MacArthur, former President Herbert Hoover and Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio who favor fundamental changes in American policy abroad: focus on Asia and disregard of Europe; independent American action and disregard of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While the Republican platform criticizes the Democratic Administration for putting "Asia last" and promises that the party would not "sacrifice the East to gain time for the West," General Eisenhower believes that the United States can best safeguard itself by paying as much attention to Europe as to Asia, and by honoring its collective security obligations.

But the cost of this kind of policy could lead to its revision. More than half the federal budget is devoted to foreign aid, defense and atomic energy programs. Those are the three pillars of contemporary

American foreign policy. The possibility that the United States might contract its undertakings abroad is implicit in this paragraph in the Republican platform: "We shall always measure our foreign commitments so that they can be borne without endangering the economic health or sound finances of the United States. . . . Sums available by this test, if competently used, will be more effective than vastly larger sums incompetently spent for vague and endless purposes."

The desires to give strong leadership to the western world in the conflict with the Soviet Union and also to save money are revealed in the planks on national defense, and taxation and monetary policy. The national defense plank says: ". . . we should develop with utmost speed a force in being, as distinguished from paper plans, of such power as to deter sudden attack or promptly and decisively defeat it. This defense against sudden attack requires the quickest possible development of appropriate and completely adequate air power and the simultaneous readiness of coordinated air, land and sea forces, with all necessary installations, bases, supplies and munitions, including atomic energy weapons in abundance. Generally, we shall see to it that our military services are adequately supported in all ways required, including manpower, to perform the appropriate tasks in relation to the defense of this country and to meet our treaty obligations. . . ."

The defense budget for the fiscal year that began on July 1 is \$46,610,938,912. That finances what the Republican platform terms "our now

disgracefully lagging program of preparedness." The platform implies that a new Administration could provide the United States with greater strength for less money. The section on taxation and monetary policy says: "We advocate . . . 1. Reduction of expenditures by the elimination of waste and extravagance so that the budget will be balanced and a general tax reduction can be made. 2. An immediate study directed toward reallocation of fields of taxation between the Federal, state and municipal governments. . . ."

Spending and Strength

Thus the Republican platform suggests that foreign policy makers of the future will suffer from the same financial restraints that have held them back in the past from realization of their aims. The question of principle in foreign policy seems to be resolved by now in all parties in favor of an active policy on the major continents, in partnership with other powers. The decision on principle, however, may not save American foreign policy from change, as a result of the cost factor. The problem of the relationship of spending to strength remains cloudy. The Republican platform says: "Only with a sound economy can we properly carry out the domestic and foreign policies which we advocate. . . ." On the other hand, by economizing, the United States might lose strength abroad until our security is in danger. Does the greater threat lie in spending too much for domestic comfort or too little for safety overseas? The United States has yet to make a decision.

BLAIR BOLLES



New Test for United Nations

As Congressional action on the eve of the presidential nomination campaign which ended in July revealed, the basic issue of foreign policy at stake in this year's historic contest is not between internationalism and isolationism; but between two forms of action by the United States in world affairs—action through cooperation with other nations, or through a unilateral, "go it alone" policy. While the Republican platform calls for cooperation, the last session of Congress posed the issue by cutting foreign policy appropriations and limiting the Administration's freedom to cooperate with other nations.

This basic issue presents a new test for the United Nations. The danger no longer is, as in the 1920's, that this country or any other will turn to isolation. Even the most impassioned advocates of untrammeled national sovereignty now recognize that interdependence—economic as well as political and military—is the hallmark of the second half of the twentieth century. The danger is that the United States, as well as some other members of the UN, might want to follow its own course on critical problems without first consulting the nations on whose support it is counting in case of war. It was the prospect of this development which disturbed Britain and other nations of Western Europe in 1951, when it appeared that the United States might carry the Korean war to the territory of Communist China. A similar preoccupation with the ultimate repercussions of "go it alone" American decisions aroused apprehension and criticism in the British House of Commons in June when the UN forces, under

American command, staged an air raid on North Korean power installations close to the border of China without prior notice to Britain.

Attacks on UN

While our friends in Europe and Asia urge us to consult them on major common problems in the United Nations, vigorous attacks are being made here not only on the United Nations but even more against UNESCO which, critics charge, is "subversive" and inimical to the best interests of the American people. Much of the criticism increasingly heard concerning the UN and other international agencies is based on misinformation or lack of information about the nature of these agencies, or is motivated by an automatic reflex of suspicion toward international organizations which, it is feared, might curtail the sovereignty of the United States. In part, too, current criticism is due to the uneasy feeling, particularly notable with respect to the Korean war, that this country is bearing a disproportionate burden in terms of human and material sacrifices and does not receive adequate support from other members of the UN. Some among us, growing impatient over the seemingly endless fighting in Korea, would like to see the United States disregard the interests of other members of the United Nations and take drastic action to end the conflict.

Current uneasiness and impatience are understandable (and actually Winston Churchill has congratulated the American people on their patience). These feelings, however, would have been less pronounced if the American public since the 1945

San Francisco conference, which saw the creation of the UN, had been given a clearer understanding both of the potentialities and the limitations of collective action in a period when all nations are in the midst of a painful transition from nationalism to internationalism. The actions of the U.S.S.R. in blocking UN decisions which it regards as inimical to its interests have been widely noted, particularly because of Moscow's frequent use of the veto. Rumblings of challenges to the UN, up to and including withdrawal, have been heard also from the Union of South Africa about the racial question and from France, first about Indo-China and more recently about Tunisia. The effort of arriving at concerted international action by the democratic procedure of majority decisions on highly explosive questions which touch national sentiments to the quick is still so new that frictions, tensions and dissensions—reflecting the world's far-reaching search for a new balance of power—are bound to occur.

Importance of UN Forum

What is important is that the world now has in the United Nations a world-wide forum where eventually all nations, no matter how much they may differ with each other, will have an opportunity to present their views and to seek international support for their cause. President Truman pointed out the significance of this function of the UN in his letter of July 3 transmitting to Congress the annual report on the United States relations with the UN. "In the United Nations,"

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Turkey: Partner of the West

Soon after V-E Day the Turkish Republic, at first alone and with no assurance of large-scale aid, began to oppose the Soviet threat. Eventually the West recognized the key location and nature of Turkey's contribution and began to give that country sizeable aid. This new interest, reinforced by the scale and spirit of the Turkish share in the Korean war, has focused increasing attention on Turkey. The West, however, is not yet generally aware of the principal postwar domestic development in Turkey, a development which has already transformed this nation from the easternmost bastion for the Western cause into an eastern exponent of Western democracy.

Despite all that Kemal Atatürk's generation has accomplished, Turkey's political order was still only a democracy-on-paper at the end of World War II, and many observers believed that the country would remain a one-party semiauthoritarian state. V-E Day, however, dispelled the necessity for a moratorium on internal political change which reasonable Turks had largely honored throughout the war. Then between 1946, when Turkey's first multiparty elections foundered on reefs of the past, and 1950, when the new Democrat party defeated the hitherto supreme People's (or Republican) party in the landslide result of an honest election, Turkey demonstrated that it was actually accomplishing what Atatürk and his supporters had always contended it could eventually accomplish: it was producing so many bona fide new Turks that a

genuinely democratic new Turkey could at last emerge.

Turkey's Policies Indigenous

Turkey's neighbors, all of them disaffected by heritages from the Ottoman past, seldom admit that this newly attained degree of democratic practice is wholly genuine. Less partial observers, however, concede that so many Turks have already taken with such enthusiasm to multiparty procedures that nothing short of foreign invasion is likely to reverse the trend. Turkey's fuller espousal of democracy is, in fact, wholly genuine in that it came from within the country. Its roots go back more than a century. Turkey's anti-Russianism—ever since communism became synonymous with Russia, anti-Russianism has automatically become anticomunism—is an equally indigenous growth. In 1945 it did not take Western pressure to turn Turkey more squarely toward democracy or to cause the country to oppose Russia. What was needed was that world conditions should enable Turkey to try its multiparty democracy. The prerequisite came with Anglo-American victory.

Events have justified the Democrat party's faith in the good sense of Turkey's retarded common man and in the wisdom of extending to him the privileges of free institutions. Backward voters naturally listen to appeals to their own personal interests: promises of better roads, local improvements, lower prices and assurances that some of Atatürk's unpopular curbs on traditional ways of

by Lewis V. Thomas

Dr. Thomas is assistant professor of Turkish language and history at Princeton University and co-author of *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951).

life will now be partly relaxed. Such relaxation is taking place—and without giving rise to the fanatic Muslim reactionary trend predicted by alarmists. The only notable result is that parts of Turkey's society are now visibly a bit more Muslim (i.e., traditional) than the erstwhile rigidly maintained official façade of complete modernism had previously permitted the casual observer to discern. This does not endanger the new political order. The secular nature of the state is not seriously compromised. There is no significant rise in Pan-Muslim or pro-Arab or pro-Persian feeling—quite the contrary. Most important, it has been shown that in Turkey, as contrasted with more troubled Muslim lands, religious reaction and fevered nationalism do not easily combine into a run-away team.

Reforms Bring Maturity

The 1950 election thus not only signalled Turkey's emergence into multiparty democracy. It marked for the Turks the successful turning of a crucial psychological corner by showing that Atatürk's "reforms" were now so well established that Turkey could and henceforth should give all citizens more latitude "to be themselves" than the previous regime had been willing to permit. This new, more matured readiness to face squarely the realities of a retarded society is the most important post-war development in Turkey, and it is felt in every sphere of life.

There has been a reversal in ideas of what a political party is. The

People's Houses, party centers which the one-party state had maintained (at government and not at party expense) in all towns, and their counterparts, the People's Rooms, of smaller communities have been taken out of party hands. The political party is no longer regarded, in the totalitarian fashion, as a legitimate tool for altering social and cultural life or as a properly subsidized arm of the state. Instead, parties have tended more to become simply vote-seeking and patronage-distributing organizations. Turkey's metropolitan press played a large role in bringing the people around this psychological corner and is now reaping its rewards, being virtually free of government control.

The frequently expressed misgiving that abandonment of one-party rule would expose Turkey to Communist infiltration has been disproved. There is a handful of Turkish Communist malcontents. The local "FBI" tries to hunt them out. Trials of such individuals are not unusual. False accusation as a Communist is a grave danger, but the Turkish version of McCarthyism has at least not led to large-scale violations of individual rights. The mass of Turkey's population is as solidly anti-Russian as were earlier Muslim Turks in past crises in the long history of Turkish-Russian conflicts.

Those who feared that multiparty life in Turkey would lead to ceaseless proliferation of parties and consequent paralysis of representative government have also been proved wrong. Turkey's Democrat party came to power as a loosely-knit coalition. Its leaders appear wholly content to let dissensions rage within the party and even to find sharp expression on the floor of Parliament, provided only that the government can command the requisite majority on vital issues. To date this has

worked well. Events seem to be evoking a measure of relaxation even in the hitherto extremely rigid internal organization of the People's party. The only serious contender for rank as a third party, the Nation party, is unremittingly active but so far has had little success at the polls. Standards and morality in Turkish political life are by no means markedly superior to what Americans regard as admissible (or inevitable), but neither can they be termed markedly worse than the going American norm. In the final result all parties abide by the count of the votes, and all jealously watch to keep the count honest.

Turkey's new maturity in democracy has important overtones but does not of itself solve many problems. In the economic realm, for example, the concept of statism—for attempting rapidly to build Turkey into a self-sufficient, industrialized nation-state through government initiative, control and finance—which had dominated the thinking of the People's party before World War II, is no longer an issue. Like other more or less unrealistic components of the one-time party-line, it has largely gone by the board through default. Turkey's leaders now face more realistically the truths of the country's poverty in resources and technical skills. The government's prime concern here is the improvement of the primitive agriculture which is the basis of Turkish life.

Hopes for further industrialization are not abandoned, but the Democrat administration is on record as favoring such development through encouraging private enterprise under minimal state control. Serious efforts are being made to attract foreign capital on terms consonant with the interests of both the Turkish economy and the foreign investor. This is an almost complete

change from the deep distrust of foreign capital which the Republic, with its memories of the regime of capitulations in late Ottoman times, had previously encouraged. So far, little private capital, foreign or local, has been attracted. The government remains saddled with ownership and operation of practically the entire state establishment, and no purchasers appear likely to bid for many of these enterprises on acceptable terms. Foreign investors hesitate to enter Turkey, not only because of the Russian threat but also because the Turks have not yet greatly altered their economic concepts nor seriously modified the role of bureaucracy with respect to private enterprise.

U.S. Aid

United States government aid is the important new factor on postwar Turkey's economic scene. What effect that aid is having and how far it is successfully seconding or guiding Turkish efforts to improve the national economy are questions for future debate. An interim appraisal of short-term results indicates that direct military aid to Turkey is relatively effective. Its goal is definite: rapidly to strengthen, mechanize and modernize Turkey's armed forces. That goal is also deceptively complex, and its ultimate implications for many phases of Turkish non-military life remain puzzling. Enthusiasm and tact have been shown by Turkish and American personnel. The results obtained—the absolute strength of the modernized Turkish forces—are consistently exaggerated in the press of both Turkey and the United States. Even so, the tax-dollar spent for Turkish defense is a distinctly sound investment from the American point of view and a welcome source of vital strength from the point of view of the Turks.

The progress of America's non-

military aid is less reassuring. In the nature of things, goals here are less explicit. Turkey's personnel still is too often Westernized in theory, versed in paper-work but divorced from first-hand experience of the primitive agriculture which poses the basic problems the United States seeks to aid Turkey in solving. American personnel frequently still too readily assumes that complex Turkish problems will automatically yield to stock American cures without painstaking, unprejudiced diagnosis of local conditions. The results to date disappoint optimists on both sides. The basic problems of the relatively more retarded regions remain virtually untouched.

Turkey has a dual nature as a recipient of American aid: it is in many ways a typical retarded area, but it is entirely untypical in that under local initiative it had long prosecuted its own program to emerge from the retarded category. Since 1945, moreover, the penetration of motor transportation and power, much of it privately owned, into rural Turkey has visibly speeded the modernization of many backward regions. Unlike the really typical retarded land, Turkey welcomes American aid and has met it more than halfway. Turkey thus represents the optimum opportunity, not the test case, for the types of aid the United States has hitherto devised. And if American measures meet only with highly qualified success in Turkey's uniquely receptive climate, what prospects have they in retarded areas where everything is still to be begun and where there is no local readiness and no local problem to meet American aid halfway or at all?

Changes in Turkish life are impressive—changes accomplished, in progress, and impending. The country, however, still remains preponderantly retarded and poor. Its prac-

ticable world-role, therefore, except in the most dire emergency, will probably remain chiefly that of a bastion for the West. Turkey lacks the developed resources requisite either to play a large-scale role far beyond its frontiers in its own right, or yet to serve as a major base from which the West could easily work. The difficulties experienced in integrating Turkey into the North Atlantic command and in reconciling some Western European states to its entry into NATO emphasize this

those limitations. The West is indeed well served in having this sturdy, forward-moving people as its bastion in the troubled East.

READING SUGGESTIONS: John Kingsley Birge, *A Guide to Turkish Area Study* (Washington, American Council of Learned Societies, 1949); Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951); Herbert J. Cummings, "Turkish Highway Program—An Interim Economic Appraisal," *Foreign Commerce Weekly* (November 19, 1951), pp. 3 et seq.; Farnsworth Fowle, "Democracy in Turkey," *The American Oxonian* (April 1951), pp. 65-70; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economy of Turkey* (Washington, IBRD,



TURKEY AND ITS NEIGHBORS

problem. As for the Turks, they have come to view unqualified membership in NATO virtually as a military guarantee by the United States that their bastion will not be regarded as ultimately expendable.

For the still nebulous purposes of the proposed Middle East command, Turkey's role, again thanks to its poverty in developed resources, must remain basically that of a bastion against Russia and only to a much lesser degree that of a power playing a major active role beyond its own frontiers. These are limitations inherent in Turkey's nature, limitations which persist despite the whole measure of progress Turkey has made and is making, with or without American aid. These limitations are not unique. Turkey is unique because of what it has become despite

1951); Republic of Turkey, Grand National Assembly, Law No. 5821, enacted August 1, 1951, published in *Official Gazette*, August 9, 1951, *A Law to Encourage Foreign Investments in Turkey* (unofficial translation available from Turkish Information Office, 444 East 52nd Street, New York); Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951); Max W. Thornburg and others, *Turkey, An Economic Appraisal* (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1949).

International Organization, by L. Larry Leonard. McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951. \$6.

A history of the development of international organization, beginning with the growth of the idea and continuing with a full discussion of the political, economic, social and colonial activities of the United Nations and related organizations. Based on the author's experiences as a staff member of UNRRA and from assignments with the UN, this volume should contribute to public understanding of important international institutions. The section on colonial activities is written by Lawrence S. Finkelstein.

Dean

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he said, "no country can escape the judgment of mankind. This is the first and greatest weapon against aggression and international immorality. It is the greatest strength of the United Nations." It is also, if we would but recognize it, the greatest protection for the United States. For if this country had attempted, on its own, without international backing, to carry out such policies as military action in Korea, it might well have found itself castigated for "imperialism" and left isolated by its friends. Instead of jeopardizing the national interests of the United States, our participation in the United Nations has enhanced this country's capacity for leadership on behalf of the non-Communist sector of the world.

That this is perhaps more widely recognized by thoughtful Americans than the sensationalized publicized attacks on the UN might indicate, is shown by the results of a poll recently conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. According to this poll, in answer to the question, "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the progress that the United Nations has made so far?" 47 percent voiced satisfaction, 38 percent dissatisfaction and 15 percent had no opinion.

To the question, "Do you think our government should continue to belong to the United Nations organization, or should we pull out of it now?" 85 percent (the highest percentage in the past two years) approved continued membership, 6 percent wished to withdraw at once, and 9 percent had no opinion.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Sloan

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it is necessary that monetary controls be removed in Europe, and that the American market be opened to foreign goods. An increase of imports into the United States is entirely feasible so long as we do not allow a flood of goods to come in which might cripple our American economy.

(Mr. Sloan, chairman of the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, has just returned from a visit to Europe where he attended the meeting of the ICC in Paris.)

The Tropics: World of Tomorrow, by Charles Morrow Wilson. New York, Harper, 1951. \$3.50.

Fuller utilization of tropical sunpower and manpower will bring enormous benefits to the world at large, according to the author of this highly readable survey of some of the world's last habitable frontiers. Mr. Wilson maintains that the Point Four program can do much to further the self-realization of these areas.

FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON GREAT BRITAIN

In the Balance, by Winston S. Churchill; edited by Randolph S. Churchill (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952). \$5.

This collection of 58 Churchill speeches made in 1949 and 1950 provides excellent material for the student of British affairs. Foreign affairs are the main theme of these speeches, made not only in the House of Commons but to audiences in the United States, Brussels, Strasbourg and Copenhagen.

In Place of Fear, by Aneurin Bevan. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1952. \$3.

The stormy petrel of the British Labor party and the protagonist of the controversial National Health Service sets down his views on domestic and foreign affairs in a book which will please neither his supporters nor his critics. His chapter on "World Leadership" should be studied by Americans as a good summary of the reasons for European "neutralism," which is now often referred to as "Bevanism."

A King's Story: The Memoirs of the Duke of Windsor. New York, Putnam, 1951. \$4.50.

This is the story of a human being as well as of a king. In addition to the factual details of his abdication, Edward tells the story of his early life and training—the story of every heir to the British throne with all the complexities and responsibilities that beset that royal personage.

Winston Churchill—1874-1951, by Lewis Broad. New York, Philosophical Library, 1952. \$6.

In the first American publication of this recently extended biography—first published in Britain in 1945—Mr. Broad has produced an objective study of Churchill's varied life from the time of the Boer war to the beginning of 1951, presenting at the same time a lively picture of 20th-century British party politics.

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